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This paper uses new micro data from the Ukrainian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (ULMS) to 
examine the gender gaps across the distribution of wages in Ukraine during communism (1986), the 
start of transition (1991), and after Ukraine started to be considered a market economy (2003). We find 
that the gender pay gap is higher in the top half of the distribution than at the bottom half and that this 
‘glass ceiling’ is persistent across the three points in time, while the wage floor rose for women in 2003.  
Closer inspection of two sectors – the private and the public – reveals the striking finding that the glass 
ceiling is lower in the public than in the private sector but the floor is the same.  We use the Machado 
and Mata (2004) method to create counterfactuals that advance our knowledge of which factors are 
driving these differences; we find that the differences in men’s and women’s rewards (βs) rather than 
differences in their productive characteristics (Xs) explain most of the wage gap throughout the 
distribution. The different ceilings in the public and private sectors are largely due to differences in 
men’s and women’s productive characteristics, which favor men in the public and women in the private 
sector.  The fall in the gender gap in the lower part of the distribution from 1986 to 2003 is explained 
partially by the improvement in women’s productive characteristics and partially by the worsening in 
men’s rewards in the bottom half of the distribution over time.  However, probably the most important 
reason for the reduction in the gap at the bottom of the distribution over time is that the value of the 
minimum wage was set relatively high in 2003 and it raised the wage floor for more women than men.   
JEL: C14 I2, J16  
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1. Introduction  
With the recent success of the Orange Revolution in establishing an independent 
democratic state in Ukraine, expectations have now turned toward joining Europe.  As Ukraine 
considers the process of seeking entry into the European Union, discussions have begun on 
how to create gender equal policies in line with those of Western Europe. Recent deliberations 
have focused on creating a new agency or ministry focused on gender rights and on drafting a 
new law on equal opportunity. 1 The countries of western Europe have exhibited a commitment 
to gender equality in the labor market; yet, recent studies have shown that ‘glass ceilings’ and 
‘sticky’ or ‘glass’ floors persist (for example Arulampalam et al., 2005; de la Rica et al., 2005; 
Albrecht et al., 2003).2   How far off is Ukraine from the European benchmarks of gender 
equality in the labor market?  Does a glass ceiling or sticky floor exist?  How much has the 
situation changed since Soviet times, with the USSR’s egalitarian ideals?    
In this paper we examine the gender wage gap in Ukraine and its determinants in three 
time periods -- a year during communism (1986) and two points in time during the transition to 
a market economy (1991 and 2003).  We also examine the gap within the public and private 
sectors in 2003. We hypothesize that the overall gender gap would be smaller during 
communism, when egalitarian principles were espoused, than in 2003, when markets were in 
play in a new economy and no explicit policies on gender equality were in effect. Similarly we 
                                                 
1 As discussed at the conference “Gender policy in the context of European Integration” hosted by the Committee 
of the Verkhovna Rada (Parliament) on European Integration and UNDP Equal Opportunities Programme on July 
5, 2005.  For example, the recent draft law, “Equal Rights for Women and Men and Realization of Equal 
Opportunities,” which passed its first Parliamentary hearing in January 2005, aims to ensure the equal rights and 
opportunities of both genders, particularly in the areas of education, professional training, employment, 
entrepreneurship, and the social sector.   
2 The term ‘sticky floor’ as discussed in Arulampalam et al. (2005) and ‘glass floor’ as discussed in de la Rica et 
al. (2005).  It refers to the gender gap at the bottom of the distribution and how persistent it is.  They define a glass 
ceiling as occurring when the 90th percentile wage gap is higher than the gap in other parts by at least 2 points; a 
sticky floor is when the 10th percentile gap is higher than the 25th gap by two points. We will be using these terms 
more loosely. 
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might expect the gap to be smaller in the public sector than in the private sector, if the 
government applies more egalitarian principles to its wage setting than the competitive market 
forces which drive wages in the private sector. If that is the case, then we would anticipate the 
overall gender gap to widen as employment in the private sector grows. However, it is also 
possible that, at least in some economic activities, competitive forces are strong enough to stifle 
discriminatory practices as found by Black and Brainerd (1999) and Weischselbaumer and 
Winter-Ebmer (2003).  Finally, we also examine the public and private sectors separately since 
the government may want to see that its own house is in order before asking for compliance 
with new wage polices from the private sector.  
Hence, we seek to advance our understanding of the size and determinants of the wage 
gaps and assist policymakers in the process of formulating more gender equal policies.  We 
analyze the gender gap at the mean and across the wage distribution to see if there are ‘glass 
ceilings’ and ‘sticky floors’ for women in Ukraine. We examine the extent to which these 
differentials are based on discrimination, measured as different returns for men and women for 
a unit of the same productive characteristic.  We also ask to what extent the gaps are due to 
differences in the composition of men and women’s labor force (in terms of human capital and 
job characteristics) in a given year or sector since we expect that the transition to markets 
changed substantially the composition of people and jobs in the labor market. Finally, we ask to 
what extent institutions, such as the minimum wage, have played a role in the gender gap.  
We apply the Machado and Mata (2004) decomposition method to new household data 
from the 2003 Ukrainian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (ULMS) and find that the male-
female wage gap is larger at the top than at the bottom of the distribution and that the gap 
remained fairly constant in all parts of the distribution in 1986 and 1991, but that it fell 
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substantially in the lower part of the distribution in 2003.   It seems that the reason that the floor 
is less sticky in 2003 compared to 1986 and 1991 is due to government intervention.  In 2003, 
the minimum wage is set at a level that is binding for women’s wages but not binding for most 
men in the bottom half of the distribution.  Moreover, the counterfactual analysis indicates that 
the improvement in the wage gap at the bottom of the distribution is driven by the better 
composition of women’s characteristics relative to men’s in 2003, compared to 1986 and 1991. 
 A striking finding is that the gaps in private sector are smaller than the gaps public 
sector in the top half of the distribution. Our decomposition results indicate that the low glass 
ceiling in the public sector is also being driven by women’s unfavorable characteristics 
compared to men in that sector; women in the private sector have more favorable 
characteristics compared to men, which compensated them for the lower returns for the same 
characteristic. Nevertheless, there is substantial evidence in each year and in each sector that 
the most important force driving the gender gaps throughout the distribution are differential 
rewards, or discrimination.   
The paper is structured as follows: A brief review of the literature is presented in 
Section 2; Ukraine’s transition experience is described in Section 3; an explanation of the data 
source is found in Sections 4; the observed wage gaps are described in Section 5, and analyzed 
with counterfactuals in Section 6; the impact of the minimum wage is discussed in Section 7; 
conclusions follow in Section 8.  
2. Literature Review 
There is a large body of research dealing with the extent to which the gap between 
men’s and women’s wages has grown in the transition countries as the market-based economies 
replaced the planned economies (see for example, Anderson and Pomfret, 2003; Brainerd, 
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2000; Joliffe and Campos, 2005; Joliffe, 2002; Jurajda, 2003; Newell and Reilly, 1996 and 
2001; and Ogloblin, 1999).3  Some argued that the market-based system would create wider 
gender differentials due to the egalitarian philosophy of socialism and others argued that a 
smaller difference might be expected if competition from markets was effective.  The evidence 
from this research has been mixed. For example, Brainerd (2000) found the gender gap grew in 
Russia and Ukraine whereas it decreased in the CEE countries.4 On the other hand, Newell and 
Reilly (2001), conclude that, in general, the gender gap has not exhibited an upward tendency 
over the 1990s in sixteen transition economies.  Orazem and Vodopivec (1995) find that the 
gender gap fell (three log points) in Slovenia from 1987 to 1991, but it is not clear if the 
difference is statistically significant.     
Various factors may be accounting for the changes in the gender wage gap and in the 
relative distribution of wages of men and women over time.  One focus has been to look for 
changes in the level of discrimination (see for e.g., Joliffe’s 2002 analysis of Bulgaria, or 
Joliffe and Campos’ 2004 analysis of Hungary).  Another factor may be changes in 
occupational segmentation (see for e.g., Jurajda’s 2003 study of the Czech Republic and 
Ogloblin’s 1999 study of Russia). One might also examine the role of the relative changes in 
returns to human capital for men and women (see for e.g., Münich, Svejnar and Terrell, 2005 
and Liu et al., 2000).  With the enormous structural changes in these economies, it is natural to 
focus on changes in the composition of the labor force.  For example, Hunt (2002) shows that 
in East Germany, the 10-point decrease in the gender wage gap was driven largely by decreases 
in employment among low-skilled women relative to men. Orazem and Vodopivec (1995) 
indicate that the improvement in women’s relative wages was due in part from the fact that 
                                                 
3 For important papers analyzing the gap in a number of industrialized, see Blau and Kahn (1996; 2003). 
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women were in sectors that benefited from transition. Others have examined the impact of 
specific factors of the transition process, such as privatization (e.g., Brainerd, 2002; Liu et al., 
2000; Munich, Svejnar and Terrell, 2005).    
Although none of the authors analyzing the gender gap in transition economies have 
examined the role of wage setting institutions and policies, Blau and Kahn (2003) test for the 
impact of the relative level of the minimum wage on the gender gap using several years of 
micro data from 22 countries, including seven transition economies.  They find a negative 
correlation between the gender gap and the “bite” of minimum wages, measured as the 
minimum wage as a share of the average wage.5  Two studies for the U.S. (Blau and Kahn, 
1997 and DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux, 1996) have also shown how the falling real minimum 
wage over the 1980s increased the pay gap between low-skilled women and men. Hence we 
contribute to the literature by asking to what extent does the minimum wage, and its changing 
value over time, affect the gender gap in Ukraine? 
Finally, with one exception, all of the studies using data from transition economies have 
only examined the average gender gap; none has addressed the question of whether wage 
ceilings and wage floors for women changed over time.6 Several recent empirical studies using 
west European data have plotted the actual and counterfactual distributions of the wage gap 
using the Machado and Mata, (2004) methodology as we do (see e.g., Albrecht et al., 2003; 
                                                                                                                                                           
4 She finds the gender gap grew by 0.27 log points in Ukraine and by 0.15 log points in Russia, whereas it declined 
between 0.03 and 0.14 points in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
5 They also find that the effect of collective bargaining agreements is significantly negative and that the effect of 
minimum wages become smaller and not significant when controlling for collective bargaining coverage.  They 
recognize that it may be difficult to disentangle the effects of minimum wages and collective bargaining since the 
level of the minimum may be influenced by the strength of unions in influencing the political process.  In Ukraine, 
the strength of unions in this period has been relatively weak.  During Soviet times, trade unions existed under the 
leadership of Central Party of the Communist Party.  After1991, trade unions became independent from the state, 
and have increasingly played a greater role in collective bargaining.  However, their influence on the political 
process, and the setting of the minimum wage, appears to have been minimal.   
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Arulampalam et al., 2005; and de la Rica, 2005).   They show the existence of glass ceilings in 
many of these countries and the fact that a ceiling exists in the public as well as the private 
sector.  Moreover, Arulampalam et al. (2005) and de la Rica (2005) find that there are large 
gaps at the bottom of the distribution for some countries, calling these phenomenon ‘sticky’ or 
‘glass’ floors.  Arulampalam et al. (2005) also find that the distribution of the gaps has not 
changed over time in the eleven European Union countries they examine, but these economies 
have undergone less structural change than the transition economies over this period.  
3.  Ukraine’s Transition  
We observe the gap in three points in time: December 1986, December 1991 and April-
July 2003.  We selected 1986 to capture the wage gap in during the Soviet period.  In August 
1991 Ukraine became independent from the USSR and this year marks the beginning of the 
transition to markets and the start of reforms.  By 2003, the last year we refer to, the economy 
was guided by markets rather than planners.  
The 1986-2003 period was marked by several different regimes and policy changes. 
Gorbachev had begun perestroika in 1985, which were the first steps in liberalizing the 
centrally planned economy, but true transformation only began after Ukraine’s independence in 
1991. In Table 1 we present some of the key policy changes that took place over this period to 
show the extent and timing of reforms.  Many reforms were gradual, e.g., price liberalization 
began in 1992 but was not completed until 1995. The privatization process was initiated in 
1992 with medium and large enterprises privatized through buyouts by managers and 
employees; the 1995-1998 mass privatization programs privatized 9,240 enterprises through 
auctions. In 1998, large-scale privatization occurred on a case-by-case basis, with the pace 
                                                                                                                                                           
6 The exception is the paper by Newell and Reilly (2001) which examines gaps using quantile regressions with 
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increasing in 2000.  By 2003, the privatization process was nearly complete with only the 
largest enterprises remaining to be privatized (Elborgh-Woytek and Lewis, 2002).  
The macro economy was unstable throughout most of the period of analysis.  GDP was 
declining almost every year between 1986 and 1999. At our second point of observation, 
Ukraine’s economy was shrinking at a rate of 10 percent and inflation was over 390 percent.  
The trough was hit in 1994 when GDP growth was -20 percent; positive rates of growth began 
only in 2000. Inflation rose to 2,000 percent in 1992 and over 10,000 percent in 1993, before it 
fell to 500 percent in 1994.7 By 2003 the economy had been stabilized for several years, with 
inflation below 5 percent and GDP growth of about 10 percent. There were three currencies 
used during our period of study: Roubles were used at the time of our first two observations 
(December 1986 and December 1991); in January of 1992, a new currency – karbovanets – was 
introduced, and then the currency used to this day – hryvnia -- was introduced in 1996.    
Wage setting was liberalized by 2003 but only after several reforms, which did not 
always tend to move forward. Nevertheless, the new Ukrainian government continued to 
require compliance with a minimum wage.  Although it was fairly low, in 1986 and 1991, by 
2003 it was set relatively high: Based on our data, the minimum wage was about 47 percent of 
the average wage in 1986, 45 percent in 1991, and 57 percent in 2003.8  This 2003 share 
averages two very different shares for men and for women: 49 percent of the average wage for 
men and 71 percent of the average wage for women.  
While the system of wage determination was reformed, Ukraine’s Labor Code still 
contains a significant amount of protective legislation for women, as outlined in Chapter XII on 
                                                                                                                                                           
pooled data on men and women and a gender dummy to estimate the gap at each percentile.  
7 From National Bank of Ukraine. 
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women’s labor. For example, it includes provisions prohibiting employment of women in 
certain occupations and in night work.9 Generous leaves of absence are given to women for 
pregnancy, childbirth and child-caring, e.g., 70 days prior to giving birth and 56 days after (in 
the case of twins or labor complications this is extended to 70 days).  Women are also given the 
option of taking a leave-of-absence from work for child-caring until the child is three years old.  
During this period women are eligible for receiving state pension benefits and can work part-
time or at home. The labor code also forbids pregnant women and women with children under 
the age of three from night work, over-time work, and work on weekends.  There are also 
constraints on imposing over-time work and out-of-town business trips on women who have 
children between the ages of 3 and 14 or children with disabilities. Pregnant women are also 
subject to lower productivity and service requirements, and may be transferred to positions with 
less heavy work and less harmful conditions, while maintaining their average salary from the 
previous occupation. (ILO, 2004)   
A new Labor Code is currently under consideration, and the draft of the new Labor 
Code, which passed its second hearing at the Parliament in 2004, includes an article (Article 4) 
on the “Prohibition of discrimination in the area of labor,” which among other forms of 
discrimination, prohibits discrimination based on sex.  Gender discrimination is also 
specifically prohibited in Ukraine’s Constitution under Article 24, which guarantees freedom 
from all forms of discrimination, including on the basis of sex.  As mentioned previously, a 
draft law covering fundamental aspects of state policy on gender equality, and definitions of 
                                                                                                                                                           
8 On March 25, 2005, the Parliament of Ukraine passed increases in the minimum monthly salary to be 
implemented in three steps: UAH290 as of April 1, 2005; UAH310 as of July 1, 2005; and UAH332 as of 
September 1, 2005. 
9 Prohibitions include strenuous occupations, occupations with harmful or dangerous conditions, and underground 
work.  Women are also not allowed to lift or carry objects with a weight exceeding a certain limit.  A list of 
dangerous and harmful occupations, as well as the weight limits for objects, is provided by the Ministry of 
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discriminatory behavior of an employer and sexual harassment is currently being revised before 
Parliament will vote on its adoption.  (Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights, 2005). 
However, gender discrimination appears to be a problem for women workers.  In a 
report on gender discrimination in the Ukrainian labor market published during the third year of 
our analysis, 2003, Human Rights Watch documented several channels of discrimination 
against women.  Primarily drawing upon information from job posting and advertisements, they 
find evidence of discrimination in hiring. For example, vacancy announcements, especially for 
high-level and high-paid positions, often specified male candidates.  They point out that even 
the State Employment Centers have gender-specific listings among their posted vacancies.  
(Human Rights Watch, 2003)  Such discriminatory practices would suggest that there may be 
discrimination in wage setting as well. 
4. Data  
Our data comes from the first wave of the Ukrainian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey 
(ULMS).  The ULMS is the first nationally representative longitudinal survey of Ukrainian 
households, administered from April 11 until June 30, 2003 and containing 4,056 households 
and 8,621 individuals. In addition to demographic information, the survey contains 
retrospective data on the characteristics of the jobs held by each member of the household in 
1986, 1991, and during 1997-2003.  We use the information on both the workers’ demographic 
characteristics and the characteristics of their main job in the reference week and in the 
retrospective sections. 
For this analysis, we created three cross sections (1986, 1991 and 2003) of individuals 
ages 15-56 who reported a monthly salary and were working full time (between 30 and 80 
                                                                                                                                                           
Health.  The list of the sectors of economy and occupations where night work is allowed is provided by the 
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hours per week).10 Since the 1986 and 1991 data are obtained retrospectively, we must consider 
how representative these cross-sections are, especially in terms of the demographic structure 
given the problem of survival bias.   Survival bias means we are unlikely to see older people in 
the earlier year.  E.g., since the oldest individuals surveyed in 2003 are 72 years old, they 
would have been 56 years old in 1986.  Hence we take two measures to correct for this: 1) We 
trim the 2003 data to 56 year olds; and 2) We follow Gorodnichenko and Sabirianova Peter 
(2004) and weight the 1986 and 1991 samples using weights created from the sample weights 
for 2003 and the information on the age and gender structure from the 1987 and 1991 Statistical 
Yearbooks of the USSR.11  
  Wage Data 
For our analyses, we use wage data from a ULMS question on the “net contractual 
monthly salary” for a main job in 1986, 1991 and 2003.12  Since we limit our analysis to 
changes in the wage gap across years, we do not convert the currencies into comparable units.  
The first question that arises with these data is the degree to which there is recall error; it can be 
argued that people may have had difficulty remembering their wages and employment status 16 
and 11 years earlier.  However, we expect the recall error to be relatively small since 1986 was 
the year of the Chernobyl nuclear explosion and 1991 was the year of Independence, events 
which most Ukrainians remember vividly. Studies have shown that respondents are less likely 
                                                                                                                                                           
Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. 
10 We restrict the sample to full-time work (40 hours/week) in the 1991 and 2003 samples since there was virtually 
no part-time work during Soviet times.  We also include individuals working 30 hours/week if they report that this 
is considered full-time at their job since this is the case for several professional occupations.  We do not include 
individuals who reported working more than 80 hours per week, due to potential misreporting. We use monthly 
salary of these full-time workers rather than hourly wage in order to reduce measurement error. 
11 The data contain sample weights for 2003 but not for the earlier periods. We found that the regional distribution 
of the 2003 sample-weighted 1986 and 1991 data is representative when compared to the Statistical Yearbook, 
hence we re-weight only on the demographic structure and not on the regional dimension. 
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to have recall lapse when they have an important event as a reference point.  Moreover, since 
wages set in the communist grid were clearly defined and did not change much over time, we 
expect them to be more easily remembered. 13  
As noted above, in August 1991, Ukraine gained independence from the Soviet Union 
and quite a few changes were made in its institutions, although the currency was initially kept 
in Rubles. Inflation was quite high at this time (although not as high as in 1992 and 1993).  
Hence, we suspect that the wage data in this period may be a bit noisier than in the other two 
data points.   
We must also consider some other potential limitations of the salary data in an 
environment of wage arrears. As in Russia, Ukraine had significant wage arrears in the mid to 
late 1990s, however in 1991 this phenomenon was not widespread and by 2003, lack of 
payment of wages was less frequent than it had been earlier. In our sample, 10.4 percent of the 
workers reported having wage arrears in the previous year.  This share was higher for men 
(12.1) than for women (8.8).  Nevertheless, the problem of wage arrears is not captured in our 
analysis since we use data from the “net contractual monthly salary,” which does not include 
arrears. 
Sample Selection 
To get a sense of the characteristics of individuals included and excluded from the 
sample, we compiled the summary statistics in appendix Table A1. We show in the columns in 
panel (a) the characteristics of the entire sample of men and women aged 15-56 in 1986, 1991 
and 2003 and in columns in panel (b) the characteristics of the analytical sample of full-time 
                                                                                                                                                           
12  Net contractual salary does not include taxes and it also does not include in-kind payments, arrears, etc.  We are 
not excluding much information by concentrating on the main job since only approximately 2 percent of the 1986 
and 2003 samples reported having a second job. 
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workers with no missing data.  Columns in panels (c) and (d) report the characteristics of the 
individuals with missing wage data and who were working less than full-time in each year.  As 
can be seen from the comparison of columns in panel (b) with columns in panels (c) and (d), 
the individuals excluded from the sample have fairly similar characteristics to those of the full-
time workers with no missing data, hence discarding them does not bias our sample.  As we 
mentioned previously, due to many events taking place in 1991, there is a higher percentage of 
individuals with missing data in this year.    
Appendix Table A1 also shows large shifts in the labor force status of the working age 
population. In columns (e) and (f) we report the share of men (women) ages 15-56 that were 
unemployed or out of the labor force, respectively.  The unemployment rates rose from 1 
percent to 14 percent for men and from 0.5 percent to 11 percent for women over the period.14  
The share of the working age population out of the labor force, which was similar for men and 
women in 1986 (16-18 percent), grew substantially in 2003 and was much higher for women 
(37 percent) than for men (23 percent). The characteristics of the men and women who are 
unemployed or out of the labor force in each year are very different from the characteristics of 
both the working men and women and total population of men and women in the 15-56 year 
old age group.  In general, the non-employed tend to be younger (15-19), less educated, and 
more likely to be unmarried.  
In explaining changes in the gaps over time, we will look at differences in the 
composition of the men’s and women’s labor force as an explanatory factor.  We report in 
Table 2 the percentage point difference in the demographic and job characteristics of men and 
women working full time within each of the three years.  We also present the differences in 
                                                                                                                                                           
13 We also note that since we use the self-reported wage as a dependent variable rather than as a regressor, we 
avoid the usual problem of “errors in variables” with respect to the right hand side variables. 
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men’s and women’s characteristics in the public and private sectors.  First, among all men and 
women, we see that more working women are in older age groups as compared to men in all 
three years.  There are relatively more women with higher education – secondary professional 
and higher – but especially in 2003.  In 1986 and 1991, there were more working women with 
less than high school education, but in 2003 there were fewer of them.  As for the economic 
activity of their job, women are more likely to be working in the education, health and social 
services sector, and the difference was even larger in 2003.  There are relatively fewer women 
in manufacturing and utilities, but especially so in 2003. In 2003 many more women are 
working in the public sector than men (12.5 percentage points), and more men are working in 
privatized firms.   
Turning to the differences in the public and private sectors, we find similar results.  The 
notable differences are: in the private sector, there are more 30-39 year old women than men, 
while this age group of men is more represented than women in the public sector; there are 
even more women with secondary professional degrees working in the public sector than in the 
private; the percentage women working in the education, health and social services sector is 
much greater in the public sector (40 percentage points); in the private sector, more women 
than men also work in education, health and social services, as well as in areas such as 
transportation, financial sector, communication, hotels and restaurants. 
5. The Observed (Raw) Gender Gaps 
To begin our analysis, we first run OLS and quantile regressions on our pooled male 
and female data separately for 1986, 1991, and 2003 with no controls to estimate the raw 
gender gap at different points in the distribution. Using quantile regression, we can estimate the 
                                                                                                                                                           
14 Our 2003 unemployment rates are very similar to the ILO estimates of overall unemployment in Ukraine. 
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θth quantile of a random variable y (in our case, the log wage) conditional on covariates, where 
the θth quantile of the distribution of yi given Xi is:15 
Qθ(yi | Xi) = Xiβθ(θ) (1) 
In this instance, to estimate the raw gender gap at different points in the distribution using 
equation (1) with no controls on our pooled male-female data, Xi is only the male dummy 
variable.   
There are three notable findings on the raw mean gender wage gaps for these three 
years.  First, the gap is relatively high in each year (ranging from 0.34 to 0.41) compared to 
Blau and Kahn’s (2003) estimates of mean raw gaps in 21 countries, where they range from 
0.14 (for Slovenia) to 0.48 (for Switzerland) and average at 0.28.16  Second, the observed mean 
gap did not change from 1986 to 1991 (when it was 0.40 and 0.41, respectively), which is not 
surprising since there had not been much reform with perestroika, as also witnessed in the lack 
of change in the structure of the labor force in appendix Table A1.  Third, counter to our 
expectations, the log wage gap declined by 2003, to 0.34. This falling trend is similar to Jolliffe 
and Campos’ (2005) results for Hungary during the first years of its transition; although they 
found a greater decline in the observed gap over a shorter period and smaller gaps in each year: 
0.31 in 1996 and 0.19 in 1998. These findings raised questions in our minds as to whether 
market competition was the driving force. 
In Figure 1 we plot the gender log wage gaps at each percentile for each of the three 
years.17  We see that the fall in the mean gap in 2003 relative to 1986 and 1991 is the result of a 
decline in the gaps in the lower half of the distribution in 2003.  The plots demonstrate ‘glass 
                                                 
15 See Koenker and Bassett (1978) and Buchinksy (1998) for a discussion of the quantile regression technique. 
16 The raw gaps are corrected for differences in hours worked. In calculating the average, we excluded the log 
wage gap for Japan because it was such an outlier at 0.895. 
17 The graph actually represents a three percentage point moving average in order to smooth the plots. 
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ceilings’ in all three years, in the sense that the gap is higher in the upper half of the distribution 
compared to the lower half.  However, there is not as steep of an increase in the gaps at the top 
quarter or ten percent, as found by Albrecht et al. (2003) in Sweden in 1992 and 1998.   
The slopes the gaps in Figure 1 are considerably flatter in 1986 and 1991 than in 2003.  
In 1986 and 1991, they rise from about 0.25 in the 10th percentile to 0.4 in the 40th percentile; 
fluctuate around 0.4 until about the 80th percentile, then rise to 0.5 in the remaining upper 
twenty percentiles.  In 2003, the gap in the 10th percentile is much lower, at 0.1, and it reaches a 
peak of nearly 0.5 already in the 50th percentile.  From the 50th to the 100th percentiles it 
fluctuates around 0.45.  The slopes of the earlier years resemble the slopes for the U.S. in 1999 
and for Sweden in 19981 and 1991 shown in Albrecht et al. (2003).   
Next, we analyze the gender gap in the public and private sectors in 2003.18 We 
hypothesized that the gender gap might be smaller in the state sector, where more ‘socialist’ 
principles of equity in pay applied, than in the private sector, where competition rules. 
However, we find that the mean gender gap is larger in the public sector than in the private 
sector: 0.39 vs. 0.26.  In Figure 2 we show the remarkable finding that the difference in the 
mean gaps in these two sectors is driven by a more binding glass ceiling in the public sector 
(with gaps of 0.4-0.5 in the top half of the distribution) than in the private sector (where the 
gaps in the top half are between 0.2 and 0.3). Moreover, the wage floor seems to be quite 
similar in the two sectors, i.e., between 0.1 and 0.3 in the bottom half of both distributions.  
When we look at the figure separating the public sector into ‘public administration, education 
and health’ and ‘other state’ (which includes state-owned enterprises), we see that it is indeed 
in public administration, education and health in which the glass ceiling is most notable.   
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This larger mean gap and lower ceiling in the public sector is surprising as this is 
counter to the findings in studies using data from both the US and European economies and yet 
it is consistent with the findings from one study using data from a transition economy. For 
example, Arulampalam et al. (2005) find smaller mean gaps and higher ceilings in the public 
sector than in the private sector in each of the eleven countries in the European Union they 
analyzed, using 1995 to 2001 data.  Moreover, Tansel (2004), using 1994 data for Turkey, 
subdivides the public sector and finds the mean log wage gap is lower in public administration 
(0.003) than in state-owned enterprises (0.222) and both are lower than the gap in the covered 
private sector (0.273), which is counter to our finding.  We also find that that the mean raw gap 
in Ukraine’s private sector is similar to the gaps in most of the European countries, which range 
from 0.134 to 0.306, in the study by Arulampalam et al. (2005).  On the other hand, Ukraine’s 
average public sector gender gap of 0.39 is much larger than the gap in any of these eleven 
countries (ranging from 0.006 to 0.259). However, our findings are similar to Jolliffe and 
Campos (2005) who find that the log wage gender gap is larger in public enterprises than in 
private firms in Hungary in 1992-1998, but that the difference is declining over time.19  This 
also raises a question as to whether the forces of competition are actually reducing gender wage 
in Hungary and Ukraine. 
6.  Counterfactual Analysis of the Gaps 
We encounter several puzzles in the observed gaps which we want to explore: (1) why 
did the ‘floor’ rise from the Communist period, when there were expressed goals of gender 
                                                                                                                                                           
18 There was insufficient employment in the private sector to be able to analyze the gender gap in these sectors in 
the earlier periods. We include in the public sector both public administration and state-owned enterprises; the 
private sector includes both domestic and foreign owned enterprises. 
19 Jolliffe and Campos (2005) found that in 1992 the public gap was 0.32 while the private gap was 0.16.  In 1998 
they were 0.20 and 0.14, respectively. 
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equity and protection of the vulnerable, to the market period, when one may expect less 
protection of vulnerable groups, the government is weaker and gender equity is not yet an 
expressed policy goal?  (2) What explains the persistence and low level of the glass ceiling 
from communism to markets? (3) Why is there a lower glass ceiling in the public sector than in 
the private sector in 2003?  
One explanation for the first puzzle may lie in differences in the composition of men’s 
and women’s labor force over time.  For example, if a relatively larger number of low-skilled 
women left such that the composition of the remaining women was more skilled, then women’s 
wages would be higher relative to men’s at the end of  the period, reducing the gap in the lower 
part of the distribution.  There is some evidence of this pattern in appendix Table A1, where we 
find that more women than men left the labor force, and in Table 2, where we see that the 
composition of the remaining employed women is comprised of relatively smaller shares with 
less education in 2003 compared to 1986. A second explanation may be that the returns to 
(prices of) the productive characteristics changed over time, favoring women. This may be 
interpreted as a decline in discrimination with the advent of markets, a conjecture that others 
are testing as well (e.g., Jolliffe and Campos, 2005).  
These factors can also apply in explaining the second and third puzzles.  That is, the 
persistence of the glass ceiling could be due to women being persistently less productive 
(compared to men) at the top of the distribution over time or it could be driven by continuous 
discrimination (i.e., lower returns to their characteristics) over time. The higher glass ceiling in 
the private sector may be due to men and women having very similar characteristics or to less 
discrimination against women in the private sector. 
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Hence we construct several counterfactuals at the means and at each percentile along 
the density of wages following the decomposition methodology developed by Machado and 
Mata (2004), henceforth MM.  We create counterfactual densities for each of the three years 
and the public and private sectors where women are given men’s characteristics (Xs) in one 
scenario, and women are given men’s “rewards” (βs) in another to learn the extent to which it 
is differences in productive characteristics or differences in rewards that explain the gaps 
within each year and sector.  We also create the counterfactual where women in 2003 are given 
their characteristics in 1986 to see to what extent the change in women’s characteristics over 
time explain the change in the gaps.  We repeat this ‘experiment’ for men in 2003.   
We apply the MM method of decomposition to create these counterfactual densities, 
using both quantile regression and bootstrapping techniques.  First, we estimate quantile 
regressions separately for men and women for each year as in equation (1), where Xi now is a 
vector of covariates, to estimate the returns to labor market characteristics (βs) at different 
points in the wage distribution.20  Secondly, we draw on the inverse probability integral 
transformation theorem, which states that if x is a random variable with a cumulative 
distribution function F(x), then F-1(x) ~ U(0,1), and so for a given Xi and a random θ ~ U(0,1), 
Xiβθ has the same distribution as  y.  In other words, using MM, we can create a random sample 
from our 1986, 1991, and 2003 samples while maintaining the conditional relationship between 
the log wages and the covariates.  We create several counterfactual distributions with the 
following steps: 
                                                 
20 The covariates in the quantile regression are: age, nationality, education, location of enterprise (Kyiv and other), 
activity of the enterprise (ISIC at the one digit level), and ownership type (state or private).  As in most data sets, 
we do not have actual experience in the workplace and hence use age and age squared as a proxy instead. The 
education variable is coded as the highest level completed, since using the highest degree completed allows returns 
to vary by the type of attainment.  The education levels are defined as: less than High School, High School 
(through grade 11), Vocational (Technical Education), Secondary Professional (two additional years after High 
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1. We randomly draw 5000 numbers from a standard uniform distribution, U(0,1) as 
the quantiles we will estimate.  
2. Using the male and female data for each year and sector, we estimate 5000 quantile 
regression coefficients β(θi) for i= 1, …, 5000, for men and women (βM(θ) and βF 
(θ)). 
3. We generate random samples of the male and female 1986, 1991 and 2003 (public 
and private) covariates (Xs) by making 5000 draws of men and women with 
replacement from each year. 
4. With our Xs and βs generated for men and women in each year, we can compute the 
predicted counterfactual wages (i.e. yi = Xiβ(θ)) and construct counterfactual gaps 
(e.g., β MXM – β MXF ,  β MXM – β FXM, etc.) 
We compare the observed gap to the counterfactual gap to learn whether the ‘experiment’ 
would lower or raise the gap.  We do not explicitly decompose the changes in the wage gaps as 
in the Blinder-Oaxaca (1979) method.21 
Some Explanations for Persistent Glass Ceilings and Rising Wage Floors 
 In Table 3 we present the observed gender gap and two counterfactual gaps for each of 
the three years 1986, 1991 and 2003 and for six points in the wage distribution. The 
counterfactuals in rows numbered (2) assume that women have men’s βs in that year, and the 
counterfactuals in rows numbered (4) assume that women had men’s Xs in that year. In each of 
                                                                                                                                                           
School), University and higher (Bachelor/Specialist/Masters/PhD). See appendix Tables A1 and A2 for the 
coefficients from quantile regressions for men and women, respectively. 
21The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition is of the form: β MXM – β FXF = βF(XM – XF)] + (βM - β F) XM, where the first 
term on the right-hand side is the part due to different observed characteristics, and the second term is the part due 
to differences in rewards and unobservables. (In the MM method there is no error term – it disappears as the 
sample size increases.) The two counterfactuals in Table 3, for example, represent terms in separate 
decompositions and do not hence add up to the observed gap.  Note the gap with counterfactual 1  = β MXM – β MXF 
= (XM-XW)βM; the gap in counterfactual 2 = β MXM – β FXM = (βM - β F) XM.  The difference in the Xs in 
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the three years we find that the gaps are positive with either of these counterfactuals, but that 
they would have been much smaller throughout the distribution if women had been “paid as 
men” and only a little smaller if women had had the same characteristics as men at each 
quantile.22 
The size of the counterfactual gaps in rows numbered (2) and (4) relative to the 
observed gap can also be interpreted as a term in separate decompositions.23  The ratios in rows 
numbered (3) indicate the importance of the differences in men’s and women’s Xs in 
explaining the observed gap, while the ratios in rows 5 indicate the importance of the 
differences in men’s and women’s βs in explaining the observed gap. We find that the 
difference in men’s and women’s pay structure (βs) is far more important than the differences 
in their characteristics (Xs) in explaining each of the gaps. This finding is consistent over time.  
On average, the differences in the βs are not as great in 2003 as in 1986 and 1991 and 
hence the 2003 gap does not drop as much as the 1986 or 1991 gaps when women have men’s 
βs.  The differences in the βs are important throughout the distribution: they explain more than 
three quarters of the gap at each point in all three years. The differences in the βs are not more 
important at the top or the bottom of the distribution, except in 2003.  In that year the gap 
would have fallen more at top (50, 75, 90) than at bottom (10, 25) if women had men’s βs.  
This means that discrimination is higher at the top of the distribution in 2003 but at the bottom 
of the distribution, women had relatively better rewards than men.  This latter finding may help 
explain the rise in the floor in 2003 compared to 1986 and 2001 (Puzzle 1).  
                                                                                                                                                           
counterfactual 1 would need to be weighted by women’s β s in order for the two counterfactuals to add up to the 
observed gap. 
22 The exception is the gap at the bottom 10 percent of the distribution for 1991 and 2003, where the gap grows 
when women have men’s Xs.  
23 These two terms do not add up to the observed gap for reasons noted earlier. 
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In Table 4 we present the counterfactuals that throw light on changes in Xs and βs over 
time, from 1986 to 2003.  We ask whether the observed gap fell at the bottom (10 and 25 
percentile) in 2003 relative to 1986 because women’s Xs or women’s βs changed in a way that 
would reduce the gap there (which is our Puzzle 1).  In addition, can we explain the persistence 
of a ceiling (gap at 50, 75, 90 percentiles) because there was no change over time in the roles 
played by βs or Xs at top of distribution?  (Puzzle 2) 
First we ask what would have happened to the gap if the distribution of women’s Xs 
had not changed from 1986, ceteris paribus.  We learn from this counterfactual (row number 4) 
that the mean (OLS) gap would not have changed at all: the counterfactual gap is 98 percent of 
the actual gap (see row number 6).24  However, the gap would have widened in the bottom of 
the distribution (at the 10th and 25th percentiles) while not changing in the percentiles at the 
median and above.  This implies that women’s Xs in the bottom of the distribution were not as 
good in 1986 as in 2003, but the Xs in the upper half of the distribution were similar in 1986 
and in 2003.  This is consistent with hypothesis that changes in women’s Xs contributed to the 
fall of gap at bottom and no change at top, and this helps us explain both Puzzles 1 and 2.25  
We also see in Table 4 that if women in 2003 had the same βs as in 1986, the gap would 
have fallen on average, by about 12 percent (row 9).  However the impact across the 
distribution is quite mixed: the gap would have risen at the very top (90th percentile) and fallen 
at the very bottom (10th percentile) and at the median, but it would not have changed in the 
other percentiles.    Hence the change in the βs from 1986 to 2003 contributed to a reduction in 
gap at top and an increase at the bottom, and do not help explain our puzzles.  
                                                 
24 Note that this counterfactual is not a component of a Oaxaca-Blinder style decomposition. 
25 The one exception is at the 50th percentile where we find that Xs in 1986 were better than Xs in 2003 so that 
change in Xs increased the gap there.  
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We turn to the counterfactuals for men in the second panel of Table 4.  If in 2003 men 
had 1986 Xs, the gap would have been somewhat smaller on average (0.28 when the actual gap 
was 0.34).  This is driven by a large decline at the 10th percentile since there is not as much of a 
difference in the 25-90 percentiles.  This means that at very bottom, men’s Xs in 1986 were 
worse than their 2003 Xs; hence the change in men’s Xs over time contributed to an increase in 
the gender gap there. This implies that men with worse characteristics left the bottom of the 
distribution. 
Finally, if men in 2003 had 1986 βs, the gap would have been about 31 percent higher 
on average (row 15).  However, the impact changes throughout distribution: it would have 
widened the gap in the bottom half (10, 25, and 50) but reduced it at the 75th and 90th 
percentiles. This means men’s 1986 βs were better than 2003 βs on average and in the bottom 
half of the distribution, but worse at the top.  This finding is consistent with a great deal of 
evidence that the transition process rewards people at top of the skill distribution, but penalizes 
the less-skilled.  Hence, changes in the βs from 1986 to 2003 contributed to increasing the gap 
at top (75, 90) and reducing it at the bottom (10, 25).  The latter helps explain Puzzle 1. 
In sum, if women were paid like men in each of the three years, the gaps would have 
fallen tremendously throughout the distribution. For example, men would have earned only 6 -
10 percent more than women on average, as opposed to 34 - 41 percent.  If women had the 
same characteristics as men in each year, the gaps would have also fallen but not by as much 
and not everywhere in the distribution.  Hence, the differences in men’s and women’s rewards 
accounts for the lion’s share of the gap in each year.  What explains the fall in the gap at the 
bottom of the distribution from 1986 to 2003 (Puzzle 1) and the persistence of the ceiling 
(Puzzle 2)? Women’s productive characteristics (Xs) improved in the bottom half from 1986 to 
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2003 but stayed the same in the top of the distribution.  The worsening of men’s pay structure 
(βs) at the bottom half of the distribution also contributed to reducing the gaps there, as it 
improved women’s relative position. 
Public-Private Sectors: what explains the different ceilings? 
We now turn to possible explanations for the third puzzle, why the gap is larger in the 
public sector at the top of the distribution.  This may result from bigger compositional 
differences between men and women within each sector or it could also be due to a higher 
degree of discrimination within one sector compared to the other (i.e., relative differences in 
men’s and women’s βs in the two sectors).  
In Table 5 we present the standard Blinder-Oaxaca type decompositions at different 
points of the distribution of wages. In rows number (1) we show the raw gender gaps in the 
public and private sectors: 0.30 and 0.26, respectively.  The counterfactuals in rows numbered 
(2) show the gap that would exist if women were rewarded with men’s pay structure in the 
same sector, ceteris paribus; the counterfactuals in rows (4) show the gaps that would exist if 
women had men’s characteristics in their same sector.  Rows numbered (3) and (5) show both 
the relative importance of the differences in men’s and women’s Xs and βs, respectively, in 
explaining the gap and the relative effect of the counterfactual to the observed gap.26   
In both the public and the private sector, the gender gap is mainly to be due to 
differences in rewards. If women had men’s βs in the private sectors, the mean gap would have 
fallen to nearly zero and it would have fallen more in the top half than in the bottom half of the 
distribution. In the public sector, the mean gap would have also fallen, but not by as much: 
                                                 
26 As noted above with the similar exercise in Table 3, these two components do not add up exactly to the 
observed gap because we are looking at BM(XM-XF) and (BM-BF)XM, when the second term should be (BM-BF)XF 
in order for the two components to add up to the observed gap.  We are more interested in seeing the gap with the 
women’s βs and Xs changed as they are in these counterfactuals, than in getting the decomposition to add up.  
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from 0.39 to 0.21.  It would have fallen more in the top than in the bottom of the distribution, 
like in the private sector.   But in the private sector, the differences in rewards explain the entire 
gender pay gap at the top: Note women would be paid more than men in the top half of the 
distribution in the private sector if they were rewarded as men are in that sector.  
There is not much difference between men’s and women’s characteristics on average, 
and the size of the mean counterfactual and observed gaps in each sector are very similar for 
each sector. However, at the bottom of the distribution (10 percentile), we see that women have 
better characteristics than men, as the part of the gap explained by the βs is more than 100 
percent.  This is even more pronounced in the public sector, suggesting that women in the 
bottom of the state pay scale have superior demographic characteristics that compensate them 
for lower rewards (potentially discrimination).  On the other hand, the composition effect is 
different for the public and private sectors in the upper part of the distribution and it helps 
explain why the ceiling is lower in the public than in the private sector (Puzzle 3).  In the 
private sector men’s Xs are worse than women’s at the 75th and 90th percentiles, whereas in the 
public sector men’s Xs are somewhat better than women’s at the 75th and 90th percentiles.  
Hence the larger gap in the top of the distribution (i.e., lower ceiling) in the public sector 
compared to the private sector is partially explained by the differences in men’s and women’s 
Xs in each sector, since women have relatively poorer characteristics in the public as compared 
to the private sector.   
7.  Another explanation for the rise in the floor from 1986/91 to 2003  
We discussed some changes in the institutions in Ukraine with the transition, and it is 
difficult to assess their impact on the change in the gender gap with the counterfactual analysis 
above.  However, we know from our analysis of wage inequality in Ukraine (Ganguli and 
- 26 - 
Terrell, 2005) that kernel density estimates for men’s and women’s wages in 1986 and 2003 
show that the minimum wage is binding for women in both years, but became especially 
important in 2003.  In Figure 3 we add estimates for the distribution of men’s and women’s 
wages those kernel density estimates in 1991 in Figure 3.  Moreover, in Figure 4 we present 
kernel density estimates for men’s and women’s wages in the private and public sectors in 
2003.  These figures clearly show the importance of the minimum wage for women in each of 
these three years. There is a clear spike in the women’s distribution of wages at a point that 
represents the minimum wage in that year. 27 The density at the spike around the minimum 
wage rises from about 0.8 in 1986 to 1.5 in 2003.  It seems as if the women’s wage distribution 
collapses around the minimum wage in 2003.  From Figure 4, it is clear that it is the public 
sector which is employing most of its female workforce at that wage. The density at the 
minimum wage is much lower in the private sector.  Hence, the decline in the gap at the bottom 
of the distribution from 1986/1991 to 2003 may have to do with better compliance with and/or 
a higher level of the minimum wage and this is affecting women more over time.  
8. Conclusion 
 In this paper, we set out to analyze Ukraine’s gender wage gap during communism and 
during the transition to a market economy, as the country moves toward Europe.  We find that 
the raw mean gender gap remained about the same from 1986 to 1991 (0.40 and 0.41, 
respectively) but declined in 2003 to 0.34.  The 1991 to 2003 decline in the average gap is the 
result of a decline in the gaps in the lower part of the distribution, indicating a stronger floor for 
women in 2003.  We find evidence that a ‘glass ceiling’ (in a loose sense) exists and is 
                                                 
27 The minimum wages in 1986 and 2003 are taken from Minimum Wage decrees. However, the minimum wage 
in 1991 is our best estimate as to what it was in that year, given that we know the minimum was raised from 70 to 
80 rubles from 1976 to 1985.  By process of interpolation, we expect it to be about 90 rubles in 1991. 
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persistent in all three years, in that the gap in the upper half of the distribution is larger than in 
the lower half.  Most notably, we find that mean gap is larger in the public sector and that the 
glass ceiling is lower in the public sector than in the private sector, which is counter to other 
studies.  A comparison with estimates for eleven European countries indicates that the mean 
gender gap in the public sector is much higher while the gap in the private sector is at similar 
levels to these European countries.     
 We find that a difference in rewards, often interpreted as discrimination, is the most 
important factor explaining the gender gap, at the mean and throughout the distribution.  We 
attribute the persistence of the glass ceiling from Soviet times throughout the transition period 
to continued discrimination and little change in the relative characteristics of men and women 
at the top.  The drop in the gap at the bottom of the distribution in 2003 appears to be a result of 
the minimum wage raising the wage floor for women over time, as well as to composition 
effects, with women’s characteristics compensating them for the discrimination (poorer set of 
wages) they may face.  However, there is also evidence that a worsening in the men’s reward 
structure at the bottom of the distribution also contributes to a decline in the gap there.  We also 
find that the lower glass ceiling in the public sector compared to the private sector is a result of 
differential composition of men and women; i.e., women’s characteristics in this sector are not 
as good as men’s when compared to the relative characteristics of men and women in the 
private sector.    
It is clear that the gender wage gap will be an important measure of gender equality in 
Ukraine in the coming years as it begins its bid to join the European Union. Our findings 
suggest that if the new government wants to implement gender equal policies, it should start re-
evaluating the system of compensation in the public sector and recognizing the incidence of 
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discrimination there.  With the glass ceiling being more prevalent in the public sector than in 
the growing private sector, the Government must recognize that it should be a model as a 
gender equal employer.  If it were to eliminate the gaps in the public sector, or at least reduce 
them to the current levels in the private sector, Ukraine’s gender wage gaps would be on par 
with the European Union.  
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Table 1: Policy Timeline 
1985 Beginning of perestroika.
1986 Wage reforms introduced in goods sectors.
1990 Ukrainian Council of Ministers formulates a "Program for Transition to a Market Economy" (Nov.)
1991 Independence from the USSR (Aug.)
Nationalization of all USSR property in Ukraine (Sept.)
Employment Act passes (legitimizes unemployment)
Creation of State Employment Service, Employment Fund
Decentralization of wage system. Tariff system still used as a benchmark to ensure wage differentials.
1992 Initial price liberalization (Jan.) 
Small- and large-scale privatization begins
Karbovanets (interim currency) introduced
Reintroduction of centralized system of wage regulation
Decree on Wages establishes minimum wage to be determined by prices of 70 goods needed for ' subsistence.'1
1993 Income-tax law adopted.
Law on Collective Contracts and Agreements establishes legal grounds for collective bargaining.
General tariff agreement sets wage coefficients for different categories of workers and sectors based on 
the minimum wage.
1995 Most prices liberalized
Voucher privatization begins
Most export quotas and licenses abolished
New Law on Wages adopted, strengthening the role of bargaining in setting wages.
1996 New currency (Hryvnia) introduced
Constitution adopted, including Article 24, which prohibits gender discrimination.
1999 New "On Subsistence Minimum" law sets a new official minimum consumption basket
2000 Significant reforms introduced in areas of government decision-making, budget, tax, land, and energy sector.2  
(e.g. Social privileges for certain population and professional groups were reduced in the 2000 State Budget Law.)
2004 Draft of new Labor Code passed second Parliamentary hearing.
2005 Draft law “Equal Rights for Women and Men and Realization of Equal Opportunities” passed first Parliamentary 
hearing.
Sources: Aslund (2002), EBRD (1999), ILO (1998), ILO (1995), Chapman (1991).
1This method was later suspended.  Now, the Cabinet of Minister decides the minimum wage, which must be approved 
by Parliament.
2 Binding at all levels of contractual regulation of wages, as agreed by the Cabinet of Ministers and twelve trade union associations.
2 See Aslund (2002) for discussion of these reforms.




86 91 03 03 03
Age
15-19 -1.3 -2.1 1.4 0.9 1.8
20-29 8.3 4.9 7.8 6.4 8.2
30-39 0.7 1.0 -1.3 1.7 -4.8
40-49 -6.1 -1.5 -6.5 -7.6 -5.2
50-56 -1.7 -2.3 -1.5 -1.5 0.0
Education Levels
Less than High School -4.6 -2.5 2.2 0.3 4.2
High School 1.1 -0.3 4.2 3.4 2.6
Vocational 13.3 10.9 11.3 16.4 5.8
Secondary Professional -8.6 -8.1 -11.4 -14.1 -7.5
Higher Education -1.3 0.0 -6.3 -6.0 -5.0
Nationality     
Ukrainian 0.6 1.0 -0.5 -1.1 -0.3
Russian -0.9 -0.7 -0.8 0.6 -1.9
Other (Including Belorussian, Jewish)
0.4 -0.3 1.4 0.5 2.2
Location     
%Kyiv 0.1 0.5 -1.5 -1.5 -2.6
%Other -0.1 -0.5 1.5 1.5 2.6
Activity of Enterprise
%Agriculture, Hunting & Forestry 4.8 2.6 3.3 3.2 1.6
%Manufacturing & Mining 8.2 6.1 11.6 15.0 2.8
%Elec, Gas, Water & Construction 4.9 6.1 10.2 10.3 10.3
%Transport, Communic. & Financial 2 -1.6 2.1 1.4 8.5 -10.5
%Public Admin. & Defense 2.4 1.6 1.6 4.7 0.3
 %Education, Health & Social Work -17.3 -17.0 -25.4 -40.0 -1.3
%Other3 -1.4 -1.4 -2.8 -1.6 -3.2
Ownership Type
% Public 0.6 -2.4 -12.5 n.a n.a
% Cooperative -0.6 0.9 0.1 n.a -0.4
%DeNovo (incl Self-Emp) 0.1 1.5 5.7 n.a -0.6
% Privatized -0.1 0.0 6.8 n.a 0.9
1 Includes Wholesale/Retail Trade, Repair of Motor Vehicles/Motorcycles; Hotels & Restaurants; Transport, 
Storage & Communication; Financial Intermediation, Real Estate, Renting & Business Activities.
2 Includes Other Community, Social and Personal Service Activities.
Note: Using sample weights.
Table 3: Decomposition of Gaps Within Each Year: All Workers 
10 25 50 75 90 OLS
1986
(1) Observed gap 0.288 0.368 0.405 0.446 0.464 0.397
(0.022) (0.019) (0.000) (0.000) (0.060) (0.015)
(2) Gap with Counterfactual1 
(BMXM - BMXF) 0.074 0.078 0.042 0.051 0.046 0.059
(3) Counterfactual 1 /observed 0.26 0.21 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.15
(4) Gap with Counterfactual2 
(BMXM - BFXM) 0.251 0.321 0.348 0.346 0.344 0.336
(5) Counterfactual 2 /observed 0.87 0.87 0.86 0.78 0.74 0.85
1991
(1) Observed gap 0.223 0.405 0.439 0.511 0.470 0.411
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.038) (0.021)
(2) Gap with Counterfactual1 
(BMXM - BMXF) 0.047 0.042 0.065 0.057 0.078 0.058
(3) Counterfactual 1 /observed 0.21 0.10 0.15 0.11 0.17 0.14
(4) Gap with Counterfactual2 
(BMXM - BFXM) 0.254 0.304 0.342 0.348 0.391 0.343
(5)
Counterfactual 2 /observed 1.14 0.75 0.78 0.68 0.83 0.83
2003
(1) Observed gap 0.069 0.192 0.470 0.504 0.442 0.336
(0.033) (0.013) (0.033) (0.003) (0.048) (0.022)
(2) Gap with Counterfactual1 
(BMXM - BMXF) 0.030 0.101 0.167 0.122 0.083 0.100
(3) Counterfactual 1 /observed 0.44 0.53 0.35 0.24 0.19 0.30
(4) Gap with Counterfactual2 
(BMXM - BFXM) 0.088 0.170 0.346 0.363 0.343 0.266
(5) Counterfactual 2 /observed 1.27 0.88 0.74 0.72 0.78 0.79
Observed gaps are estimated from a quantile or OLS regression with no controls and using sample weights. 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
The  counterfactuals are estimated using the Machado-Mata approach, with separate quantile regressions 
and separate random samples generated from covariates for men and women in each sector:
1Gap with Counterfactual =  (XM-XW)BM
2Gap with Counterfactual = (BM-BW)XM
Table 4: Decomposition of Gaps Across Time, 1986 and 2003: All  Workers 
Gap  10 25 50 75 90 OLS
(1) Observed in 1986 0.288 0.368 0.405 0.446 0.464 0.397
(0.022) (0.019) (0.000) (0.000) (0.060) (0.015)
(2) Observed in 2003 0.069 0.192 0.470 0.504 0.442 0.336
(0.033) (0.013) (0.033) (0.003) (0.048) (0.022)
(3) Observed '03/ Observed '86  0.240 0.523 1.159 1.130 0.952 0.847
Counterfactuals for Women:
(4) Gap with Counterfactual1 
(BM03XM03 - BF03XF86) 0.112 0.223 0.415 0.460 0.431 0.328
(5) Counterfactual1/Obs. '86 0.389 0.605 1.024 1.031 0.928 0.827
(6) (5)/(3) 1.620 1.157 0.884 0.913 0.975 0.976
(7) Gap with Counterfactual2 
(BM03XM03 - BF86XF03) 0.054 0.182 0.365 0.467 0.497 0.295
(8) Counterfactual2/Observed '86 0.189 0.495 0.900 1.047 1.071 0.744
(9) (8)/(3) 0.787 0.947 0.777 0.927 1.125 0.878
Counterfactuals for Men:
(10) Gap with Counterfactual3 
(BM03XM86 - BF03XF03) 0.031 0.174 0.371 0.440 0.418 0.282
(11) Counterfactual3/Observed '86 0.109 0.472 0.915 0.986 0.900 0.709
(12) (11)/(3) 0.456 0.903 0.789 0.873 0.945 0.838
(13) Gap with Counterfactual4 
(BM86XM03 - BF03XF03) 0.409 0.440 0.478 0.436 0.370 0.441
(14) Counterfactual4/Observed '86 1.422 1.196 1.180 0.977 0.796 1.110
(15) (14)/(3) 5.931 2.287 1.018 0.865 0.836 1.311
Observed gaps are stimated from a quantile or OLS regression with no controls and using sample weight. 
Standard errors are in parentheses.
The following counterfactuals are estimated using the Machado-Mata approach, with separate quantile 
regressions and separate random samples generated from covariates for men and women in each sector:
1If women in 03 had Xs of women in 86
2If women in 03 had Bs of women in 86
3If men in 03 had Xs of men in 86
4If men in 03 had same Bs of men in 86
Table 5:  Decomposition of the Gap Within the Public and the Private Sector, 2003
10 25 50 75 90 OLS
Public
(1) Observed gap 0.069 0.223 0.470 0.539 0.516 0.391
(0.042) (0.014) (0.036) (0.051) (0.051) (0.028)
(2) Gap with Counterfactual1 
(BMXM - BMXF) 0.072 0.173 0.301 0.244 0.178 0.211
(3) Counterfactual 1 /Observed 1.05 0.78 0.64 0.45 0.34 0.54
(4) Gap with Counterfactual2 
(BMXM - BFXM) 0.146 0.249 0.437 0.448 0.416 0.376
(5) Counterfactual 2 /Observed 2.11 1.12 0.93 0.83 0.81 0.96
Private
(1) Observed gap 0.069 0.201 0.336 0.236 0.297 0.255
(0.051) (0.069) (0.069) (0.049) (0.058) (0.036)
(2) Gap with Counterfactual1 
(BMXM - BMXF) 0.018 0.019 -0.005 -0.013 -0.034 0.004
(3) Counterfactual 1 /Observed 0.26 0.09 -0.02 -0.05 -0.12 0.02
(4) Gap with Counterfactual2 
(BMXM - BFXM) 0.115 0.141 0.299 0.347 0.363 0.257
(5) Counterfactual 2 /Observed 1.67 0.70 0.89 1.47 1.22 1.01
Observed gaps are estimated from a quantile or OLS regression with no controls and using 
sample weight. 
The following counterfactuals are estimated using the Machado-Mata approach, with 
separate quantile regressions and separate random samples generated from covariates for 
men and women in each sector:
1Women in a given sector have their own characteristics (Xs) but are "paid like men" (i.e. 
men's quantile regression coefficients).
2Women in a given sector have their own Bs but men's characteristics (Xs).
Figure 1: Gender gaps Across the Distribution  for 1986, 1991 and 2003 
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Figure 2:  Gender Gap in the Public and Private Sectors in 2003
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1 1985 Minimum Wage Salary (80 Rubles = Log value of -0.613).  
2 2003 Minimum Wage (185 Hryvnia = Log value of -0.495).
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Figure 4: Kernel Density Estimates of Men's and 
Women's Wages in the Private and Public Sectors, 2003
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Table A1: Sample Selection (Using Sample Weights)
Total Sample, 15-56
Analytical Sample 
Employed FT1 Missing Wage/Empl. Info Employed PT
Unemployed (Job-
Seeking) Out of LF
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
86 91 03 86 91 03 86 91 03 86 91 03 86 91 03 86 91 03
MEN
Observations 2451 2600 2843 1684 1450 1355 337 675 307 26 29 110 22 56 410 382 390 661
% of Total Sample, age 15-56 100% 100% 100% 69% 56% 48% 14% 26% 11% 1% 1% 4% 1% 2% 14% 16% 15% 23%
Age
15-19 17.6 15.1 16.1 2.2 3.1 2.9 5.1 3.4 4.0 0.0 0.0 9.6 56.5 40.2 10.2 71.0 64.7 52.4
20-29 32.9 25.4 24.2 36.2 27.1 27.4 34.8 27.0 27.4 45.5 20.1 18.9 29.8 21.6 30.0 21.4 18.7 13.8
30-39 24.3 26.4 20.9 31.3 31.3 24.7 27.6 32.0 26.3 40.7 43.1 21.3 10.4 23.2 24.7 1.0 3.7 8.4
40-49 14.8 19.0 23.7 18.6 22.6 28.4 19.4 22.8 27.7 13.8 32.9 31.1 3.3 11.5 24.3 1.0 3.3 11.2
50-56 10.3 14.1 15.1 11.7 16.0 16.5 13.2 14.8 14.7 0.0 4.0 19.2 0.0 3.5 10.9 5.6 9.5 14.3
Education Levels
Less than High School 20.4 16.7 15.0 12.7 9.6 4.8 17.1 11.2 7.7 5.9 0.0 7.5 35.2 31.9 9.0 45.9 44.4 43.4
High School 27.4 25.6 24.3 26.9 25.1 22.7 24.2 25.1 26.2 38.0 37.2 20.4 22.1 33.0 25.7 30.6 26.3 26.5
Vocational 26.8 28.7 30.3 29.4 31.0 33.4 28.4 32.2 30.3 32.1 39.5 37.4 37.8 20.3 41.3 17.0 17.4 16.4
Secondary Professional 14.9 17.0 17.4 18.0 19.6 21.9 16.4 17.9 18.3 14.2 13.1 16.3 2.3 11.1 16.1 5.4 9.2 8.8
Higher Education 10.5 11.9 13.1 13.1 14.6 17.2 13.8 13.7 17.4 9.8 10.1 18.4 2.6 3.7 8.0 1.2 2.8 4.9
Nationality
Ukrainian 78.5 77.7 79.2 78.2 78.7 77.9 78.2 76.2 79.2 97.5 89.3 83.0 78.6 68.3 79.2 78.5 77.2 81.4
Russian 18.1 18.5 16.7 18.3 18.0 17.5 17.5 18.5 16.4 2.5 7.2 11.4 13.5 18.3 18.3 19.0 20.4 14.9
Other (Including Belorussian, Jewish)
3.5 3.9 4.1 3.6 3.3 4.6 4.3 5.3 4.4 0.0 3.5 5.5 8.0 13.4 2.4 2.6 2.5 3.7
WOMEN
Observations 3458 3606 3682 2263 1871 1494 521 882 178 47 45 225 17 54 415 610 754 1370
% of Total Sample, age 15-56 100% 100% 100% 65% 52% 41% 15% 24% 5% 2% 1% 6% 0.7% 1% 15% 25% 21% 37%
Age
15-19 13.4 14.3 13.1 3.5 5.1 1.5 3.6 5.1 3.0 2.5 6.0 3.1 30.6 34.3 8.2 51.0 41.5 31.0
20-29 26.9 23.0 22.7 27.9 22.2 19.6 26.5 22.7 19.6 25.4 12.2 18.0 48.4 32.6 31.5 24.0 25.0 24.5
30-39 26.4 26.3 20.9 30.6 30.2 26.0 31.4 34.6 26.6 51.8 38.1 27.2 6.8 27.9 23.1 8.8 9.1 12.5
40-49 19.9 19.4 26.6 24.7 24.1 34.9 20.7 23.2 38.8 17.6 37.6 34.6 14.2 5.2 25.5 5.1 5.8 14.6
50-56 13.4 17.0 16.8 13.4 18.4 18.0 17.8 14.4 12.1 2.8 6.1 17.1 0.0 0.0 11.8 11.1 18.6 17.4
Education Levels
Less than High School 22.8 18.1 12.2 17.2 12.1 2.6 21.4 12.2 7.0 14.6 8.9 4.9 28.0 14.2 7.4 41.1 37.3 26.7
High School 26.6 26.1 24.7 25.8 25.4 18.5 23.3 24.7 25.0 17.0 0.4 19.1 24.1 27.0 25.7 31.9 28.6 32.2
Vocational 15.6 18.3 20.6 16.1 20.1 22.1 16.5 18.7 23.2 24.8 15.3 19.5 38.9 22.1 26.2 12.1 13.9 17.0
Secondary Professional 22.9 24.7 26.7 26.5 27.8 33.3 24.0 28.0 25.8 27.9 35.5 27.0 6.5 25.8 29.7 11.1 14.3 18.3
Higher Education 12.2 12.9 15.8 14.3 14.6 23.5 14.7 16.4 19.1 15.7 9.6 29.6 2.6 11.0 11.1 3.9 6.0 5.9
Nationality
Ukrainian 77.8 77.6 78.5 77.6 77.7 78.5 80.1 77.7 79.5 69.3 81.2 80.5 56.4 74.9 74.4 77.3 77.2 79.2
Russian 19.0 18.8 17.6 19.2 18.7 18.4 16.8 18.4 17.1 30.7 12.2 16.3 43.6 18.4 20.3 18.9 19.5 16.1
Other (Including Belorussian, Jewish)
3.3 3.6 4.0 3.2 3.5 3.2 3.1 3.9 3.4 0.0 6.7 3.2 0.0 6.7 5.3 3.8 3.2 4.7
1 For 1986, FT means they did not report working 'always' or 'sometimes' part-time; For 2003, FT means reporting between 40 and 80 hours/week, or 30-40 hours/week if it is considered FT at that job.
*
* * * * * * * * * *
* * * * * * * * * * * * *
Table A2: OLS & Quantile Regressions: Men
1986 1991 2003
OLS 10 25 50 75 90 95 OLS 10 25 50 75 90 95 OLS 10 25 50 75 90 95
Nationality (Ukrainian omitted)  
Russian 0.089** 0.011 0.094** 0.076* 0.091* 0.150* 0.085 0.169** 0.123* 0.169** 0.136** 0.126** 0.034 0.313* 0.046 -0.019 -0.015 0.085 0.092 0.132 0.018
(0.029) (0.067) (0.030) (0.035) (0.035) (0.067) (0.109) (0.040) (0.060) (0.041) (0.034) (0.044) (0.079) (0.131) (0.040) (0.074) (0.058) (0.045) (0.065) (0.075) (0.079)
Other (inc. Byelorussian, Jewish)
-0.066 -0.009 -0.070 -0.116 -0.181* -0.213 -0.052 0.131 0.285** 0.085 0.009 0.068 0.072 0.445* 0.115 -0.022 -0.075 0.131 0.123 0.525** 0.437**
(0.061) (0.139) (0.065) (0.072) (0.069) (0.130) (0.197) (0.090) (0.100) (0.093) (0.075) (0.094) (0.154) (0.225) (0.073) (0.127) (0.106) (0.086) (0.113) (0.149) (0.139)
Education (Less than HS omitted)
High School 0.045 -0.013 0.093* 0.079 -0.008 0.069 0.069 -0.005 -0.016 0.035 -0.005 -0.016 -0.065 0.066 0.009 0.151 0.009 0.043 0.053 0.095 -0.273
(0.042) (0.094) (0.040) (0.049) (0.050) (0.094) (0.165) (0.062) (0.093) (0.065) (0.053) (0.069) (0.124) (0.155) (0.077) (0.137) (0.110) (0.086) (0.121) (0.156) (0.145)
Vocational 0.112** 0.060 0.101** 0.174** 0.089 0.149 0.255 0.051 0.065 0.056 0.056 0.016 0.101 0.234 0.042 0.180 0.040 0.112 0.068 0.128 -0.221
(0.041) (0.090) (0.038) (0.048) (0.048) (0.093) (0.163) (0.061) (0.089) (0.062) (0.051) (0.068) (0.122) (0.149) (0.075) (0.131) (0.106) (0.084) (0.116) (0.152) (0.138)
Secondary Professional 0.191** 0.189 0.225** 0.251** 0.172** 0.128 0.209 0.247** 0.145 0.155* 0.197** 0.180* 0.402** 0.451** 0.183* 0.286* 0.186 0.261** 0.205 0.262 -0.015
(0.044) (0.097) (0.041) (0.052) (0.052) (0.099) (0.166) (0.064) (0.098) (0.066) (0.054) (0.072) (0.128) (0.164) (0.078) (0.135) (0.110) (0.088) (0.122) (0.158) (0.147)
Higher Ed (Bach, Spec, Masters, PhD) 0.239** 0.273** 0.350** 0.294** 0.139* 0.192 0.236 0.313** 0.298** 0.307** 0.288** 0.333** 0.349** 0.337 0.394** 0.442** 0.387** 0.464** 0.460** 0.557** 0.221(0.048) (0.106) (0.045) (0.055) (0.057) (0.103) (0.170) (0.069) (0.097) (0.069) (0.057) (0.075) (0.130) (0.177) (0.081) (0.140) (0.114) (0.090) (0.125) (0.160) (0.150)
Age 0.029** 0.015 0.014 0.033** 0.043** 0.024 0.039 0.039** 0.034* 0.038** 0.028** 0.043** 0.055** 0.029 0.036** 0.017 0.015 0.042** 0.049** 0.039 0.050*
(0.009) (0.019) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010) (0.021) (0.035) (0.011) (0.017) (0.012) (0.009) (0.012) (0.021) (0.033) (0.011) (0.021) (0.016) (0.012) (0.018) (0.020) (0.022)
Age2 -0.000**-0.000 -0.000 -0.000* -0.001* -0.000 -0.000 -0.001* -0.000* -0.000* -0.000* -0.001* -0.001* -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 -0.001* -0.001* -0.000 -0.001*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Kyiv 0.103* 0.142 0.051 0.137* 0.130* 0.078 0.004 0.271** 0.080 0.054 0.091 0.168* 0.359** 1.826** 0.209** 0.004 0.143 0.344** 0.282** 0.207* 0.303*
(0.047) (0.118) (0.053) (0.063) (0.061) (0.109) (0.139) (0.063) (0.104) (0.067) (0.057) (0.072) (0.123) (0.191) (0.055) (0.100) (0.090) (0.066) (0.092) (0.103) (0.122)
Activity of Enterprise (Agriculture is omitted)
Manufacturing & Mining 0.395** 0.367** 0.407** 0.430** 0.466** 0.403** 0.354* 0.441** 0.352** 0.439** 0.442** 0.451** 0.449** 0.474** 0.740** 0.886** 0.725** 0.813** 0.582** 0.550** 0.313*
(0.032) (0.074) (0.033) (0.039) (0.041) (0.082) (0.155) (0.047) (0.075) (0.049) (0.039) (0.051) (0.093) (0.140) (0.054) (0.097) (0.078) (0.059) (0.088) (0.105) (0.122)
Electricity, Gas, Water & Construction
0.250** 0.367** 0.235** 0.255** 0.172** 0.212* 0.195 0.306** 0.274** 0.312** 0.400** 0.295** 0.279* 0.236 0.649** 0.857** 0.547** 0.721** 0.554** 0.592** 0.253
(0.044) (0.095) (0.045) (0.053) (0.055) (0.107) (0.195) (0.061) (0.097) (0.064) (0.051) (0.066) (0.119) (0.179) (0.062) (0.114) (0.090) (0.069) (0.099) (0.118) (0.132)
Transport, Communic. & Financial1
0.173** 0.284** 0.210** 0.243** 0.123** 0.063 -0.053 0.341** 0.235** 0.353** 0.314** 0.326** 0.251* 0.340* 0.654** 0.752** 0.598** 0.745** 0.545** 0.503** 0.249
(0.038) (0.087) (0.040) (0.047) (0.047) (0.091) (0.167) (0.053) (0.085) (0.056) (0.045) (0.059) (0.107) (0.168) (0.057) (0.099) (0.082) (0.063) (0.093) (0.112) (0.130)
Public Administration & Defense
0.294** 0.400** 0.308** 0.314** 0.294** 0.238 0.073 0.356** 0.304* 0.233** 0.230** 0.290** 0.372* 0.713** 0.688** 0.956** 0.615** 0.735** 0.543** 0.460** 0.072
(0.053) (0.119) (0.057) (0.068) (0.070) (0.136) (0.220) (0.080) (0.126) (0.086) (0.070) (0.091) (0.164) (0.241) (0.080) (0.146) (0.118) (0.091) (0.128) (0.153) (0.161)
Education, Health, & Social Work
-0.131* -0.059 -0.131* -0.128 -0.070 -0.184 -0.256 -0.032 -0.026 0.009 -0.083 -0.077 -0.151 -0.180 0.113 0.534** 0.221* 0.091 -0.149 -0.223 -0.483**
(0.054) (0.136) (0.056) (0.066) (0.068) (0.115) (0.171) (0.076) (0.110) (0.077) (0.065) (0.081) (0.137) (0.224) (0.073) (0.144) (0.107) (0.082) (0.120) (0.139) (0.159)
Other2 0.042 0.149 0.067 0.081 -0.012 -0.079 -0.231 0.231** -0.081 0.130 0.193** 0.297** 0.172 0.205 0.357** 0.615** 0.354** 0.416** 0.221 0.163 -0.150
(0.055) (0.123) (0.056) (0.069) (0.070) (0.117) (0.211) (0.079) (0.112) (0.083) (0.067) (0.085) (0.139) (0.238) (0.077) (0.132) (0.106) (0.084) (0.118) (0.135) (0.151)
Constant -0.649**-0.857* -0.699* -0.841* -0.597* -0.017 -0.109 -0.922* -1.354* -1.232* -0.797* -0.722* -0.560 -0.039 -1.159* -1.779* -1.063* -1.384* -0.935* -0.565 0.051
(0.150) (0.351) (0.169) (0.195) (0.184) (0.391) (0.690) (0.191) (0.294) (0.218) (0.168) (0.221) (0.388) (0.542) (0.202) (0.395) (0.297) (0.228) (0.327) (0.351) (0.391)
N = 1666 1666 1666 1666 1666 1666 1666 1430 1430 1430 1430 1430 1430 1430 1340 1340 1340 1340 1340 1340 1340
R-Squared = 0.17 0.15 0.23
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
1 Includes Wholesale/Retail Trade, Repair of Motor Vehicles/Motorcycles; Hotels & Restaurants; Transport, Storage & Communication; Financial Intermediation, Real Estate, Renting & Business Activities.
* * * * * * * *
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Table A3: OLS & Quantile Regressions: Women
1986 1991 2003
OLS 10 25 50 75 90 95 OLS 10 25 50 75 90 95 OLS 10 25 50 75 90 95
Nationality (Ukrainian omitted)  
Russian 0.027 0.072** 0.051** 0.025 -0.001 -0.045 -0.091 0.056 0.079** 0.042 0.091** 0.105** 0.018 0.029 0.130** 0.054 0.075** 0.113** 0.146** 0.141* 0.063
(0.023) (0.025) (0.012) (0.019) (0.026) (0.039) (0.064) (0.031) (0.029) (0.024) (0.032) (0.025) (0.056) (0.096) (0.034) (0.045) (0.025) (0.032) (0.036) (0.064) (0.096)
Other (inc. Byelorussian, Jewish)
0.015 -0.002 0.000 -0.003 -0.064 0.084 0.134 0.050 0.054 -0.025 -0.025 -0.000 -0.128 0.528** 0.001 0.165 0.105* 0.038 0.102 -0.077 -0.108
(0.050) (0.050) (0.024) (0.041) (0.058) (0.080) (0.148) (0.066) (0.056) (0.046) (0.067) (0.050) (0.123) (0.134) (0.073) (0.087) (0.052) (0.067) (0.077) (0.124) (0.167)
Education (Less than HS omitted)
High School 0.078** 0.109** 0.022 0.109** 0.088** 0.017 0.014 0.071 0.079* 0.038 0.099* 0.092** 0.030 -0.105 0.188* 0.050 0.120* 0.227** 0.125 0.239 0.220
(0.030) (0.030) (0.014) (0.025) (0.033) (0.049) (0.082) (0.044) (0.036) (0.032) (0.044) (0.033) (0.074) (0.125) (0.086) (0.104) (0.060) (0.080) (0.089) (0.142) (0.139)
Vocational 0.133** 0.133** 0.093** 0.188** 0.128** 0.064 0.111 0.143** 0.076 0.093** 0.150** 0.120** 0.179* 0.069 0.201* -0.002 0.121* 0.246** 0.134 0.277* 0.269
(0.034) (0.034) (0.017) (0.029) (0.039) (0.056) (0.093) (0.048) (0.039) (0.035) (0.049) (0.037) (0.084) (0.139) (0.085) (0.104) (0.059) (0.079) (0.088) (0.141) (0.138)
Secondary Professional 0.133** 0.174** 0.132** 0.213** 0.096** 0.080 0.083 0.178** 0.219** 0.194** 0.198** 0.125** 0.089 0.038 0.281** 0.096 0.153** 0.316** 0.222* 0.403** 0.375**
(0.030) (0.032) (0.015) (0.025) (0.033) (0.051) (0.087) (0.045) (0.036) (0.032) (0.044) (0.034) (0.074) (0.124) (0.084) (0.100) (0.058) (0.078) (0.087) (0.140) (0.129)
Higher Ed (Bach, Spec, Masters, PhD) 0.394** 0.398** 0.415** 0.473** 0.481** 0.447** 0.374** 0.460** 0.371** 0.422** 0.494** 0.503** 0.490** 0.378** 0.523** 0.241* 0.376** 0.614** 0.533** 0.723** 0.794**(0.035) (0.038) (0.017) (0.029) (0.038) (0.057) (0.095) (0.050) (0.043) (0.037) (0.050) (0.038) (0.084) (0.135) (0.085) (0.102) (0.059) (0.079) (0.089) (0.141) (0.136)
Age 0.009 0.002 0.005 0.015* 0.010 -0.001 -0.018 -0.002 0.023** 0.000 0.004 -0.008 -0.024 -0.033 0.012 0.030* 0.007 0.007 0.004 0.004 -0.006
(0.007) (0.008) (0.003) (0.006) (0.008) (0.011) (0.019) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008) (0.017) (0.028) (0.010) (0.012) (0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.018) (0.026)
Age2 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000* 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Kyiv 0.116** 0.109** 0.117** 0.117** 0.077 0.079 0.074 0.355** 0.112** 0.094* 0.085 0.207** 0.661** 1.958** 0.296** 0.110 0.136** 0.278** 0.371** 0.354** 0.486**
(0.037) (0.038) (0.019) (0.033) (0.046) (0.074) (0.116) (0.050) (0.040) (0.037) (0.055) (0.044) (0.099) (0.161) (0.044) (0.058) (0.034) (0.044) (0.051) (0.089) (0.126)
Activity of Enterprise (Agriculture is omitted)
Manufacturing & Mining 0.246** 0.181** 0.208** 0.277** 0.208** 0.270** 0.344** 0.251** 0.197** 0.223** 0.300** 0.221** 0.290** 0.344** 0.362** 0.831** 0.360** 0.269** 0.440** 0.187 -0.059
(0.030) (0.033) (0.015) (0.025) (0.034) (0.051) (0.084) (0.042) (0.041) (0.032) (0.044) (0.035) (0.074) (0.124) (0.056) (0.070) (0.043) (0.053) (0.061) (0.108) (0.157)
Electricity, Gas, Water & Construction
0.239** 0.188** 0.233** 0.202** 0.209** 0.248** 0.321** 0.254** 0.321** 0.227** 0.279** 0.223** 0.392** 0.339 0.444** 1.023** 0.411** 0.382** 0.474** 0.237 -0.053
(0.048) (0.051) (0.024) (0.040) (0.054) (0.075) (0.106) (0.069) (0.065) (0.050) (0.069) (0.052) (0.116) (0.183) (0.082) (0.099) (0.059) (0.076) (0.084) (0.136) (0.168)
Transport, Communic. & Financial1
0.033 0.001 -0.004 0.068* -0.011 -0.024 0.013 0.056 0.067 0.048 0.084 -0.051 0.091 0.198 0.274** 0.665** 0.230** 0.156** 0.393** 0.185 -0.080
(0.033) (0.037) (0.017) (0.028) (0.038) (0.056) (0.090) (0.046) (0.044) (0.035) (0.048) (0.037) (0.081) (0.144) (0.056) (0.070) (0.043) (0.053) (0.061) (0.108) (0.158)
Public Administration & Defense
-0.015 -0.024 -0.050 -0.000 -0.111 -0.149 -0.009 0.182* 0.151* 0.068 0.181* 0.099 0.275* 0.521** 0.253** 0.828** 0.301** 0.104 0.299** 0.052 -0.343
(0.054) (0.055) (0.027) (0.046) (0.060) (0.085) (0.131) (0.075) (0.072) (0.055) (0.077) (0.061) (0.129) (0.177) (0.081) (0.100) (0.059) (0.076) (0.091) (0.169) (0.229)
Education, Health, & Social Work
-0.112* -0.036 -0.116* -0.124* -0.215* -0.270* -0.182* -0.098* 0.010 -0.043 -0.076 -0.251* -0.215* -0.247 -0.013 0.746** 0.174** -0.071 -0.099 -0.472* -0.753**
(0.032) (0.037) (0.017) (0.027) (0.036) (0.052) (0.088) (0.045) (0.043) (0.034) (0.047) (0.036) (0.076) (0.128) (0.054) (0.065) (0.041) (0.051) (0.059) (0.105) (0.156)
Other2 0.014 0.038 -0.046* -0.023 -0.042 0.064 0.253 -0.016 0.033 -0.002 -0.015 -0.023 -0.003 0.006 0.166* 0.795** 0.225** 0.061 0.158* -0.088 -0.220
(0.043) (0.049) (0.023) (0.036) (0.049) (0.076) (0.129) (0.061) (0.057) (0.047) (0.064) (0.048) (0.110) (0.180) (0.065) (0.083) (0.049) (0.063) (0.072) (0.127) (0.185)
Constant -0.578* -0.875* -0.702* -0.771* -0.261 0.177 0.529 -0.496* -1.417* -0.802* -0.696* -0.086 0.461 0.927 -0.938* -2.106* -1.041* -0.815* -0.496* -0.132 0.513
(0.118) (0.137) (0.062) (0.105) (0.141) (0.199) (0.327) (0.149) (0.144) (0.116) (0.170) (0.141) (0.313) (0.537) (0.202) (0.261) (0.151) (0.192) (0.221) (0.353) (0.520)
N = 2230 2230 2230 2230 2230 2230 2230 1849 1849 1849 1849 1849 1849 1849 1475 1475 1475 1475 1475 1475 1475
R-Squared = 0.15 0.14 0.19
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
1 Includes Wholesale/Retail Trade, Repair of Motor Vehicles/Motorcycles; Hotels & Restaurants; Transport, Storage & 
Communication; Financial Intermediation, Real Estate, Renting & Business Activities.
2 Includes Other Community, Social and Personal Service Activities.
Note: Using sample weights.
